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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In his brief on the cross-appeal, plaintiff/appellant 
(hereinafter "plaintiff") does not dispute the statement of 
facts set forth in the brief of appellees. Appellees/ 
defendants ("the Van Wagoners") , therefore, rely on their 
original statement of facts in this reply brief on the cross-
appeal . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. EVIDENCE MARSHALLING IS NOT REQUIRED WHEN CHALLENGING 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE REVIEWED FOR 
CORRECTNESS. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT INDICATE THAT CAROL 
KLAS HAD ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO ACT AS PLAINTIFF'S AGENT 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF CONTROLLED THE TERMS AND MANNER OF THE 
SALE OF THE HOME. 
III. PLAINTIFF IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS AGENT'S ACTIONS. THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT INDICATE THAT CAROL KLAS 
WAS PLAINTIFF'S AGENT AND INDICATE THAT CAROL KLAS 
COMMITTED FRAUD AND/OR MADE MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT THE VAN WAGONERS SHOULD HAVE 
DISCOVERED THE APPRAISAL CONCEALED BY CAROL KLAS IS 
UNREASONABLE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF MISCONSTRUES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Plaintiff erroneously asserts that the Van Wagoners have 
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not marshalled the evidence as part of their cross-appeal. 
Plaintiff's point would be valid if the Van Wagoners were 
challenging findings of fact (as plaintiff is on his appeal). 
The Van Wagoners, however, are challenging conclusions of law. 
Specifically, the Van Wagoners claim that given the trial 
courtfs findings of fact, the trial court should have 
concluded, as a matter of law, that: 
1. Carol Klas was plaintiff's agent; and 
2. Plaintiff was bound by his agent fs fraud 
and/or misrepresentations. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out, conclusions of 
law are afforded no deference, but are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.,786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 
1990); Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). The Van 
Wagoners contend that the Trial Court's conclusions of law are 
incorrect. 
II. THE RECORD SUPPORTS A CONCLUSION THAT CAROL KLAS WAS 
PLAINTIFF'S AGENT. 
A. Defendants provided citations to the record. 
The predominant theme of plaintiff's response brief is 
the alleged failure of the Van Wagoners to support their 
argument with citations to the record. The van Wagoners did 
Z 
cite the record, but specifically relied on the courtfs 
findings of fact. 
Plaintiff contends that the Van Wagoners have not cited 
"a single finding by the Court, point of authority, nor a 
single reference to the transcript that evidences the 
existence of an agency relationship.11 (Plaintiff's Reply 
Brief at p.25). To maintain that argument, plaintiff simply 
ignores the Van Wagoners1 citation to the trial court's 
findings of fact regarding plaintiff's ownership of the 
property in question in fee simple. (Amended Findings of Fact 
Nos. 2 and 4, record p.238, Brief of Appellees at p.27). 
Plaintiff also ignores the Van Wagoners' citation to the 
testimony of Carol Klas which indicates that plaintiff 
controlled the manner in which the home was sold: "[plaintiff] 
gave me some guidelines to follow. We drew up an add. I 
primarily wrote the add. He reviewed it and said it would be 
acceptable to him." (Transcript, Vol. II, p.83, L.16-21; Brief 
of Appellees, Appendix p.3). These references support 
defendants' contention that plaintiff controlled the process 
for the disposition of the home. 
Plaintiff also contends that he had no control over the 
asking price for his home. (Plaintiff's Reply Brief at p.26 
("he didn't even set the sales price".)) While plaintiff may 
not have set the sales price, he certainly controlled the 
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asking price and valuation of the home. Indeed, the divorce 
decree upon which plaintiff relies as the source of Carol 
Klas' authority to sell the home specifically states "if 
defendant [Carol] finds a buyer who is willing and able and 
ready to purchase the [home in question] at a price and upon 
terms acceptable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall pay to 
[Carol a finderfs fee]." (Finding of Fact No. 4; transcript 
Vol. I, at p.8, L.2-11; Brief of Appellees, Appendix p.3). 
(Emphasis added). Clearly, plaintiff controlled the price and 
terms upon which the home would be sold. 
Plaintiff's brief invites error because it suggests an 
erroneous standard of review for the challenge to the court's 
conclusions of law and because it ignores both the court's 
findings of fact and the Van Wagoners' reliance on these 
findings. 
B. The record supports a conclusion of agency. 
It is true that the trial court made no specific 
conclusion of law that Carol Klas was plaintiff's agent. 
Perhaps the point was too obvious. Nonetheless, the findings 
of fact do support a conclusion of agency: 
1. Plaintiff owned the home in fee simple. 
(Finding of Fact No. 2). 
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2, The home was offered for sale subject to the 
terms of the divorce decree. (Finding of Fact 
No. 3). 
3. The divorce decree permitted Carol Klas to 
sell the home, but required the sale to be on 
terms and at a price acceptable to plaintiff. 
4* Carol Klas undertook the marketing of the home 
pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree. 
(Finding of Fact No. 4). 
5* Plaintiff, not Carol Klas, acquired appraisals 
on the home. (Finding of Fact No. 5). 
6. Carol Klas represented to defendants that 
appraisals had been made. (Finding of Fact 
No. 7). 
Carol Klas had actual authority to sell the home for 
plaintiff. As plaintiff has pointed out, 
In general, the determinative question 
has usually been posed as one of 
"control", the view being that if the 
defendant controls, or has the right of 
control, the manner in which the 
operations are to be carried out, the 
defendant is liable as a master. 
Foster v. Steed, 432 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah 
1967). 
The trial court's findings of fact listed above demonstrate 
that plaintiff had such control. Thus, Carol Klas was acting 
as plaintiff's agent. 
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III. BASED UPON THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
HAVE CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
FRAUD AND/OR MISREPRESENTATIONS OF HIS AGENT. 
Plaintiff's second and third points correctly note that 
the Van Wagoners' claims of fraud and misrepresentation 
against plaintiff are based upon plaintiff's responsibility 
for the fraud and/or misrepresentation of his agent, Carol 
Klas. Indeed, defendants never have claimed otherwise. 
Once again however, Plaintiff attempts to sustain his 
arguments by ignoring the trial court's findings of fact and 
requesting this court to accept plaintiff's argumentative 
interpretation. For example, plaintiff argues that "there is 
a serious question as to how important the appraisal 
information really was," (plaintiff's Reply Brief at p.28). 
The trial court specifically found that the appraisal was 
important; it would have made a material difference to the 
defendants had it been disclosed. (Finding of Fact No. 30; 
record at p.305). 
Plaintiff also ignores the trial court's specific 
findings as follows: 
1. The Van Wagoners asked Carol Klas about the 
existence of appraisals on the home. (Finding 
of Fact No. 30; record at p.305). 
2. The Van Wagoners based their offer on the 
representations made by Carol Klas. (Finding 
of Fact No. 31; record at p.305-06). 
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3. Carol Klas withheld a lower appraisal on the 
value of the home. (Finding of Fact No. 30; 
record at p.305). 
4. That lower appraisal would have made a 
material difference in the Van Wagoner's offer 
to buy the home. (Finding of Fact No. 30; 
record at p.305). 
Plaintiff's argument that the trial court should have 
found facts differently is irrelevant to the point at issue. 
The point is that the trial court should have concluded, as a 
matter of law, that plaintiff was responsible for his agent's 
fraud and/or misrepresentations given its own findings of 
fact. 
IV. PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE THIS COURT ADOPT AN UNREASONABLE 
STANDARD FOR RELIANCE. 
Plaintiff argues that the Van Wagoners' inquiry into the 
existence of appraisals "does not measure up to the [reliance] 
standard required by the court." (Plaintiff's Reply Brief at 
p.30). Plaintiff claims that the Van Wagoners did not take 
reasonable steps to inform themselves as to the appraisal 
values. Id. The argument attempts again to recharacterize 
the trial court's findings of reasonable reliance. 
According to plaintiff, it was the Van Wagoners' duty to 
discover if Carol Klas had failed to disclose appraisals after 
the Van Wagoners had specifically asked her for a disclosure. 
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The argument posits the absurd duty to undertake a global 
search to verify whether Carol Klas had disclosed information 
in her possession in response to a specific request. The so-
called duty is all the more ludicrous in this case since Carol 
Klas did disclose the existence of three appraisals; she just 
withheld all information and reference to the one legitimate 
appraisal in the group because it did not support a higher 
purchase price. Put in the rhetorical question form, how 
could the Van Wagoners have discovered let alone known to look 
for the missing appraisal given Carol Klas' representations. 
The Van Wagoners justifiably relied on her honesty and her 
duty to respond truthfully as to the existence of appraisals 
and to what the appraisals indicated. Unfortunately, Carol 
Klas did not disclose an unfavorable, material appraisal. 
There is nothing the Van Wagoners could have done to discover 
this undisclosed appraisal. 
Plaintiff's opinion that the additional appraisal "would 
not seem to make any difference11 is irrelevant. Again, the 
trial court specifically found that the additional appraisal 
would have made a material difference in the Van Wagoners1 
decision to make an offer on the home. (Finding of Fact No. 
30; record at p.305). 
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V. CONCLUSION. 
The Van Wagoners respectfully request that this court 
reverse the trial court's dismissal of the Van Wagoners1 
counterclaim for fraud as John Klas, through his agent Carol 
Klas, clearly had a duty to speak when asked about appraisals, 
and the omission to disclose the one material appraisal 
constituted fraud and/or a material misrepresentation. 
The Van Wagoners respectfully request that the court 
enter judgment on the counterclaim and remand that part of the 
case for a finding on the issue of the Van Wagoners1 damages. 
DATED: June 20, 1991 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Alexander H. Walker III 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing APPELLEES REPLY BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL this 20th 
day of June, 1991, with postage prepaid and addressed to: 
Brant H. Wall 
WALL & WALL 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Alexander H. Walker III 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
6000.kls 
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